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An increasing number of central banks manage market expectations via
interest rate projections. Typically, those projections are updated only quar-
terly and thus, may become stale when new information enters the mar-
ket. We use data from New Zealand to investigate the time-varying and
state-dependent effects of interest rate projections on market expectations
and interest rate uncertainty. Confirming the stabilizing effect of fresh cen-
tral bank announcements, we show that interest rate uncertainty rises be-
tween two projection releases. Moreover, rate uncertainty and the impor-
tance of macroeconomic news increase if expectations deviate from the rate
projected by the central bank. Counterfactual analysis suggests that the
efficiency of projections would improve if the central bank updated its pro-
jection whenever it becomes stale.
Keywords: Central bank interest rate projections, central bank commu-
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1 Introduction
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, many central banks have adopted forward
guidance, defined as statements about the likely path of the future policy rate, in order
to anchor rate expectations more firmly and to curb the volatility of interest rates. The
growing literature on central bank communication suggests that forward guidance is
also useful in less turbulent times. In particular, the publication of interest rate pro-
jections is a powerful tool for both explaining monetary policy and guiding market
expectations, see e.g. Rudebusch and Williams (2008) and Hughes Hallett et al. (2012).
Yet, only few central banks used forward guidance before the crisis. In 1997, the Re-
serve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) was the first central bank to publish projections of
the future 90-day bank bill rate in order to guide interest rate expectations up to three
years in the future. The RBNZ publishes projections only once a quarter and a similar
timing has been adopted by several other central banks, including the Norges Bank
and the Sveriges Riksbank, see Andersson and Hofmann (2010). Consequently, quar-
terly projections may become stale when new information enters the market. Since
the remaining information content of a current projection is not always obvious, stale
projections may even undermine the transparency of monetary policy and the expec-
tations management of the central bank. This paper explores the time-varying and
state-dependent effects of the RBNZ’s projections on interest rate expectations and un-
certainty in order to assess the empirical consequences of stale forward guidance.1
The usefulness of regularly announced interest rate projections for central bank com-
munication is still under debate. The information content of central bank interest rate
projections is typically investigated in event studies that focus on the projections’ im-
pact on market rates at or close to the announcement day, see Moessner and Nelson
(2008), Ferrero and Secchi (2009), Detmers and Nautz (2012), Moessner (2013) and
Winkelmann (2013). In the same vein, Swanson (2006) shows that interest rate uncer-
1Recently, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the U.S. Federal Reserve (FED) used forward guid-
ance to assure that policy rates will be low for an extended period of time, see ECB (2014). Forward
guidance as provided by the RBNZ’s regular interest rate projections, however, is not to be misinter-
preted as a commitment to the projected interest rate path.
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tainty in the United States typically decreases on the day of monetary policy announce-
ments. Bauer (2012) uses an event study to demonstrate that the forward guidance of
the U.S. Federal Reserve during the financial crisis both shifted the expected path of
the federal funds rate and reduced uncertainty surrounding those expectations. Good-
hart and Lim (2011) conclude from a forecast analysis that the RBNZ’s interest rate
projections are useless for a horizon of more than two quarters ahead. According to
Neuenkirch (2012), publication of interest rate projections contributes to a high trans-
parency index of the RBNZ which is found to reduce the bias and variation of rate
expectations. However, none of these contributions considers the time-varying infor-
mation content of probably stale interest rate projections.
Our paper builds on Ehrmann and Sondermann (2012), who investigate the time-
varying effect of the quarterly Bank of England Inflation Report on various market
interest rates. They find that central bank communication becomes stale, because in-
terest rate uncertainty as well as the relative importance of macroeconomic news rise
between two releases of inflation reports. However, their application does not allow to
investigate state-dependent effects of central bank communication because the stale-
ness of an Inflation Report cannot be measured directly. In contrast, in our application,
the staleness of an interest rate projection is reflected in the futures rate whose matu-
rity exactly matches the rate projected by the central bank. The spread between these
interest rates reveals to what extent market expectations continue to rely on the projec-
tion and can, therefore, be used as a direct measure for the degree of its staleness. In
particular, large deviations of market expectations from the projected rate indicate that
the projection has become stale.
We propose two hypotheses on the time- and state-dependent effects of interest rate
projections. Hypothesis 1 emphasizes the varying importance of macroeconomic news
for rate expectations. Following Ehrmann and Sondermann (2012), macroeconomic
news become relatively more important for the formation of rate expectations as the
information content of an ageing interest rate projection decreases. Moreover, the rel-
ative influence of macroeconomic news on rate expectations should also increase if
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markets perceive the current projection to be stale, i.e. if the spread between the fu-
tures and the projected rate increases. Finally, this state-dependent effect of projections
should also be time-dependent. In particular, a stale projection may not be a big issue
for market expectations if it is already seen as outdated. Hypothesis 2 focuses on the
effects of projections on interest rate uncertainty. Interest rate uncertainty should in-
crease between two releases of central bank projections and if markets perceive the in-
terest rate projection to be stale. Similar to the rationale behind Hypothesis 1, however,
the uncertainty-increasing effect of stale projections is the stronger, the longer markets
have to wait for an updated projection. We test these predictions on the empirical con-
sequences of stale interest rate projections within an EGARCH model for daily changes
in futures rates of various maturities. While results concerning Hypothesis 1 depend
on the macroeconomic news variable under consideration, the predictions on the time-
and state-dependent effects of central bank projections on interest rate uncertainty are
strongly confirmed by the data.
Our estimation results suggest that the efficiency of interest rate projections could
be improved by the central bank along two dimensions. On the one hand, projections
could be more useful if they were updated more frequently. However, in monetary
policy practice providing projections more often may not be a realistic option. This par-
ticularly applies for central banks like the ECB and the FED where each new projection
would require the approval by a committee, compare Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007).
On the other hand, the central bank could update its projection whenever markets per-
ceive the current projection as too stale. In order to evaluate the volatility effects of
alternative implementation schemes, we employ a counterfactual analysis based on
our estimated EGARCH models. The results strongly indicate that the performance
of the RBNZ’s projections would improve by using a more flexible, state-dependent
implementation scheme that ensures a certain freshness of projections.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the
RBNZ’s interest rate projections and explain how to measure their degree of staleness
using futures data. Section 3 discusses the effects of stale projections on market ex-
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pectations, interest rate volatility, and the relative importance of macroeconomic news.
Section 4 introduces the econometric model and presents the estimation results. Sec-
tion 5 provides a counterfactual analysis of alternative implementation schemes for
interest rate projections. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2 The Interest Rate Projections of the RBNZ
Since 1997, the RBNZ has been projecting the 90-day bank bill rate for the following 8 to
12 quarters within its quarterly Monetary Policy Statement (MPS).2 Figure 1 shows that
interest rate projections change substantially from one release to the next. Apparently,
projections often lose much of their relevance over the course of a quarter.
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Notes: Quarterly projections for the 90-day bank bill rate around its actual monthly level
(continuous bold line). The light shaded area refers to the period as of September 2008. The
vertical line represents the end of the sample. Data are taken from the Monetary Policy State-
ments of the RBNZ from March 2000 through February 2013. Source: Detmers and Nautz
(2012)
2In the following empirical analysis, the sample period runs from March 1, 2000 until February 28,
2013. The sample period does not start already in 1997 because of data availability problems for
some control variables, see Appendix. Notice further that this sample period avoids a structural
break due to changes in the RBNZ’s monetary policy framework in 1999, see Guender and Rimer
(2008).
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Interest rate projections are published quarterly and are, thus, by construction con-
stant between two publication days. This implies, however, that the actual projection
horizon is not constant but shrinks in the course of a quarter. For example, the maturity
of a projection for j quarters ahead has declined to virtually j − 1 quarters when the
next projection is about to be published. Therefore, we adjust the quarterly projection
data to obtain daily data for projections with a constant maturity of j quarters. The
maturity-adjusted projection pjt employed in the empirical analysis increasingly incor-
porates information from the (unadjusted) projection for j + 1 quarters ahead. More
precisely, daily data for the maturity-adjusted pjt is obtained as a weighted average of
the two unadjusted interest rate projections for j and j + 1 quarters ahead, where the
weight of the projection for j + 1 quarters rises linearly over time. As a result, pjt is not
necessarily constant between two publications, compare Figure 3 in the appendix.
We use futures rates on the 90-day bank bill rate j quarters ahead as a proxy for
prevailing market expectations about future interest rates. The empirical analysis is
restricted to j = 1, . . . , 5 since data for longer-term futures rates are available only from
2007 onward. Following Detmers and Nautz (2012), futures rates are also adjusted in
order to obtain data with constant maturity, f jt , that exactly match the maturity of the
corresponding projection rate pjt.
If f jt is close to p
j
t, market expectations are in line with the central bank projection
suggesting that the perceived information content of the current projection is still high.
Yet, new information might lead markets to expect the future interest rate to differ
from the current central bank projection. In this case, the information content of the
projection has become stale and f jt should deviate from p
j
t. In the following empirical
analysis, we use the spread | f j − pj|t−1 as a measure for the degree of staleness of the
interest rate projection pjt.
Table 1 provides first information about the staleness of interest rate projections for
different maturities. As expected, the average staleness of projections rises with in-
creasing maturity and is higher during the financial crisis. Time-series plots of futures
and projected rates are shown in Figure 3 in the Appendix.
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Table 1 The average staleness of interest rate projections
maturity in quarters j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j=5
pre-crisis: March 1, 2000 - Sep 12, 2008
median(| f j − pj|) 16.74 24.39 31.26 36.61 37.39
crisis: Sep 15, 2008 - Feb 28, 2013
median(| f j − pj|) 19.38 31.90 48.94 55.48 55.52
Notes: We use the spread between the futures rate and the corresponding projection,
| f j − pj|t−1, as a proxy-variable for the degree of staleness of an interest rate projec-
tion. Median is denoted in basis points. We assume that the crisis period started with
the Lehman failure on September 15, 2008.
3 The Time-Varying and State-Dependent Effects of
Interest Rate Projections
This section develops two testable hypotheses concerning the time-varying and state-
dependent effects of central bank interest rate projections on (1) the dynamics and (2)
the volatility of futures rates. All hypotheses stem from the fact that the RBNZ’s inter-
est rate projections are released only quarterly and are not updated between releases.
Typically, market expectations and thus, futures rates are roughly in line with the cen-
tral bank interest rate projection, at least shortly after the release of a new interest rate
path. However, as time goes by and new information arrives, market expectations
may start to deviate from the central bank projection and the spread | f j − pj| widens
accordingly.
Figure 2 shows the development of market expectations following the projection’s
release on September 4, 2003. While interest rate expectations are initially in line with
the central bank interest rate projection, expectations begin to diverge after about 20
business days. Apparently, with new information entering the market, the remaining
information content of the current interest rate projection becomes dubious. The result-
ing signal-extraction problem may imply (a) time-varying, (b) state-dependent, and (c)
7
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Notes: The Figure shows the RBNZ’s interest rate projection for j = 1 (dashes line) and the cor-
responding futures rate between two interest rate projections in 2003. The increased spread indi-
cates that markets eventually perceive the central bank projection to be stale.
a combination of time- and state-dependent effects of projections on both, market ex-
pectations about future interest rates as well as interest rate uncertainty. Hypothesis 1
focuses on the effects of projections on the relative importance of macroeconomic news
for interest rate expectations.
Hypothesis 1: The relative importance of macroeconomic news for rate expectations
a) rises between two releases of interest rate projections
b) is the larger, the wider the spread | f j − pj|.
c) The effect claimed in b) is the larger, the longer markets have to wait for an updated projec-
tion.
The intuition behind Hypothesis 1 is as follows: As time between two releases
elapses, interest rate projections age and their significance declines. This implies that
macroeconomic news become relatively more important for the formation of rate ex-
pectations which explains part a). Similarly, the relative influence of macroeconomic
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news on rate expectations increases if | f j − pj| is large and markets perceive the recent
projection to be stale, compare part b). According to part c), this state-dependent ef-
fect should also be time-dependent. In particular, a stale projection should not distort
market expectations significantly when the new projection is about to be published.
Hypothesis 2: Interest rate uncertainty
a) rises between two releases of interest rate projections
b) is the larger, the wider the spread | f j − pj|.
c) The effect claimed in b) is the smaller, the longer markets have to wait for an updated projec-
tion.
Hypothesis 2a considers the purely time-varying effect of projections on interest rate
uncertainty. When the current projection ages, markets cannot be sure of its contin-
uing relevance, especially since the central bank does not comment on the projection
once it has been published. Therefore, the information content of a projection declines
over time implying increasing interest rate uncertainty until the new projection is pub-
lished. Beyond this pure time-effect, 2b states that uncertainty also rises if markets
believe the recent interest rate projection to be stale, i.e. if the rate expected by the mar-
ket increasingly deviates from the rate projected by the central bank. Finally, 2c takes
into account that effects of stale projections are also time-dependent because markets
distinguish between a deviation of futures rates from the central bank projection ob-
served at the beginning and the end of a quarter.
The purely time-varying effects of central bank announcements stated in part a) of
our hypotheses are also discussed by Ehrmann and Sondermann (2012) who examine
the time-varying effects of the quarterly publications of the Bank of England’s inflation
reports. They do not, however, consider the state-dependent effects of stale central bank
communication as in part b) and c) of our hypotheses.
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4 The Time-Varying and State-Dependent Effects of
Interest Rate Projections: Empirical Results
4.1 The Econometric Model
Market expectations about the future 90-day bank bill rate j quarters ahead are re-
flected in the corresponding futures rate f jt . We model the daily change in expectations
as follows:




γk,τxkt · τt + ∑
k
γk,sxkt | f − p|t−1
+∑
k
γk,s,τxkt | f − p|t−1τt + ηZt + εt (1)
where we suppressed the maturity-index j throughout the equation for the sake of
readability and Zt controls for monetary policy days. According to Equation (1), mar-
ket expectations depend on various macroeconomic news variables (xk), interest rate
projections (| f − p|), and the age of the current projection (τt). We calculate 0 ≤ τt ≤ 1
as the number of days since the last release divided by the length of the quarter. Thus,
τt equals 0 at the announcement day and 1 the day before the subsequent announce-
ment. Note the impact of macroeconomic news variables on rate expectations is not
necessarily constant over time (γk), but could be time-varying (γk,τ) or state-dependent
(γk,s). Finally, we allow for a combined effect which is captured by the coefficient
(γk,s,τ) of the interaction variable xkt | f − p|t−1τt.
According to Hypothesis 1, the relative importance of macroeconomic news on rate
expectations should increase both a) over time between two releases (γk,τ > 0) and
b) in the spread | f − p| (γk,s > 0). Following part c) of Hypothesis 1, the latter
state-dependent effect of macroeconomic news should be the stronger, the longer mar-
kets have to wait for an updated projection (γk,s,τ < 0). The set of macroeconomic
news variables incorporates surprises resulting from quarterly announcements of GDP
(xGDP) and inflation (xCPI) as well as the daily changes of U.S. bond yields with two
10
year maturity (∆rUS) and of New Zealand’s effective exchange rate (∆e). This set of
macroeconomic variables should capture the main determinants of the RBNZ’s inter-
est rate policy.3
Interest rate uncertainty is not constant over time. Following Ehrmann and Sonder-
mann (2012), the conditional variance of futures rates is assumed to follow an aug-
mented EGARCH(1,1) model. For each maturity j = 1, . . . , 5, we consider the follow-
ing variance equation:
log(σ2t ) = ωo + ω1
∣∣∣∣ εt−1σt−1
∣∣∣∣+ ω2 εt−1σt−1 + ω3log(σ2t−1) + ψDt
+ρττt + ρ
s| f − p|t−1 + ρs,τ| f − p|t−1τt (2)
where Dt controls for monetary policy days as well as announcement days of GDP
and inflation data. According to Hypothesis 2a, uncertainty should rise over time until
the next projection is published. In the variance equation above, this implies ρτ >
0. Correspondingly, ρs measures the state-dependent effect of a projection on interest
rate uncertainty. Following Hypothesis 2b, interest rate uncertainty increases the more
interest rate expectations deviate from the central bank projection which implies that
ρs > 0. However, we also expect this effect to decrease between two projection releases
implying ρs,τ < 0, compare Hypothesis 2c.
4.2 Empirical Results
4.2.1 Projections, market expectations, and macroeconomic news
We estimated the empirical model for the pre-crisis and the crisis period separately. Let
us first summarize the results obtained for the impact of macroeconomic variables on
interest rate expectations. Table 2 provides no evidence in favor of the pure time-effects
3More information about the controls is provided in Table 8 in the Appendix. We used bond yields
with two year maturity because this captures the complete projection horizon under consideration.
We also experimented with interest rates from Australia and with an economic surprise index for
New Zealand provided by Citigroup but none of these variables proved to be significant.
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Table 2 The response of rate expectations in New Zealand to U.S. interest rates
j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j=5
pre-crisis: March 1, 2000 - Sep 12, 2008
∆rUSt
0.09*** 0.21*** 0.29*** 0.33*** 0.39***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
∆rUSt · τt
0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.09
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
∆rUSt · | f − p|t−1
0.51*** 0.26*** 0.11 0.03 -0.06
(0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
∆rUSt · | f − p|t−1 · τt
-0.31** -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.08
(0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
crisis: Sep 15, 2008 - Feb 28, 2013
∆rUSt
0.10** 0.35*** 0.30** 0.33*** 0.16
(0.05) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
∆rUSt · τt
0.04 -0.18 -0.10 -0.10 0.35*
(0.08) (0.16) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18)
∆rUSt · | f − p|t−1
-0.25** -0.43*** -0.12 -0.09 0.15
(0.10) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
∆rUSt · | f − p|t−1 · τt
0.39*** 0.62*** 0.32 0.25 -0.17
(0.14) (0.20) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22)
Notes: The table shows the time-varying and state-dependent effects of U.S. bond yields on futures
rates of maturity j, see Equation (1). *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level;
standard errors in parentheses. For the complete set of results, see Tables 6 and 7.
emphasized in Hypothesis 1a.4 In contrast to Ehrmann and Sondermann (2012), pure
time-effects are not significant for the relative importance of macroeconomic variables
for rate expectations in New Zealand. However, significant state-dependent effects
are found for the influence of inflation surprises during the crisis period. In line with
Hypothesis 1b, the response of rate expectations to inflation surprises is the stronger,
the staler the current interest rate projection, compare the third panel in Table 3. In both
sample periods, U.S. interest rates are the most important drivers for changes in New
4The complete set of results is provided in Table 6 and 7 in the Appendix. Tables 2 and 3 do not
show the estimates obtained for the effective exchange rate because the results were economically
small and statistically insignificant for all maturities and for both periods. Since GDP and inflation
announcements are always made at the same point in time within a quarter, time-effects are not
estimated for the corresponding surprise variables, see Table 3.
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Zealand’s interest rate expectations, see Table 2. Before the crisis, the results obtained
for shorter maturities (j = 1, 2) provide strong evidence in favor of Hypotheses 1b and
1c, see the first panel of Table 2. While the impact of U.S. rates increases when the
current projection becomes stale, i.e. if the spread | f − p| widens, this state-dependent
effect vanishes when the stale projection ages. A significant (yet, wrongly signed) state-
dependent effect of U.S. rates can also be found for the crisis period. Again, in line with
Hypothesis 1c, this state-dependent effect of stale projections shrinks with the age of a
projection.
4.2.2 Projections and Interest Rate Uncertainty
Table 4 summarizes the estimation results on the time-varying and state-dependent
effects of probably stale interest rate projections on interest rate uncertainty based on
the variance equation (2).
According to Hypothesis 2a, interest rate uncertainty should increase between two
releases of projections implying ρτ > 0. Table 4 shows that this purely-time dependent
effect is particularly important in the crisis period. In this period, an ageing projection
contributes significantly to higher market uncertainty. It is worth emphasizing that
this effect confirms the usefulness of projections in the crisis, since uncertainty drops
in response to a fresh projection. We also find strong empirical support for a state-
dependent effect of interest rate projections on uncertainty. Confirming Hypothesis 2b,
we estimate that interest rate uncertainty increases significantly (ρs > 0) when interest
rate expectations deviate from the corresponding interest rate projection. This result
holds for the pre-crisis as well as the crisis period and irrespective of the projection
horizon.5 The uncertainty-increasing effects of stale projections are also found to be
time dependent. Particularly for shorter horizons (j < 5), the distorting impact of a
stale projection shrinks when the projection becomes older. Put differently, in line with
Hypothesis 2c, the distorting effects of stale projections are the more severe, the longer
5Note that the smaller coefficients estimated for the crisis period do not necessarily imply less state-
dependence since the deviations between futures rates and the central bank projections are typically
more pronounced in the crisis period.
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Table 3 The response of rate expectations in New Zealand to surprises in inflation and
GDP
j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j=5
pre-crisis: March 1, 2000 - Sep 12, 2008
CPI surprises
xCPI
0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03**
(0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.01)
xCPI · | f j − pj| -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
GDP surprises
xGDP
-0.003 -0.01 0.004 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
xGDP · | f j − pj| 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
crisis: Sep 15, 2008 - Feb 28, 2013
CPI surprises
xCPI
-0.00 -0.01 -0.004 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
xCPI · | f j − pj| 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
GDP surprises
xGDP
0.01 0.04 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
xGDP · | f j − pj| 0.13* 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.03
(0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Notes: The table shows the empirical results for the effects of CPI and GDP surprises on futures rates
of maturity j from equation (1).Since those surprises occur at the same point in time in every release
period, variables are only interacted with the staleness measure | f j − pj|t−1. *** (**) [*] denotes sig-
nificance at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level; standard errors in parentheses. For the complete set of results
refer to Tables 6 and 7 as well as to Table 8 for an explanation of the variables.
markets have to wait for an updated projection.
The estimation results indicate that central bank interest rate projections are a help-
ful tool for expectations management but they could probably be used more efficiently.
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Table 4 Interest rate projections and interest rate uncertainty in New Zealand
j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j=5
pre-crisis: March 1, 2000 - Sep 12, 2008
ρ̂τ
0.15** -0.04 -0.07 -0.16 -0.17
(0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
ρ̂s
1.22*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.50*** 0.31***
(0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.11) (0.10)
ρ̂s,τ
-0.98*** -0.62*** -0.64*** -0.28*** -0.16
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.16) (0.15)
crisis: Sep 15, 2008 - Feb 28, 2013
ρ̂τ
0.27*** 0.61*** 0.48*** 0.17*** 0.10**
(0.05) (0.13) (0.12) (0.07) (0.05)
ρ̂s
0.34*** 0.81*** 0.41*** 0.11* 0.03
(0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.06) (0.05)
ρ̂s,τ
-0.38*** -0.80*** -0.44*** -0.10 -0.02
(0.12) (0.18) (0.15) (0.09) (0.07)
Notes: The table shows the estimates from the conditional variance equation of futures rates with
maturities of j quarters, compare Equation (2). *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %]
level, standard errors in parentheses. For the complete set of results, refer to Tables 6 and 7 in the
appendix.
First, as a consequence of the estimated time-effects, interest rate projections could be
provided more frequently instead of only quarterly, with even daily updated projec-
tions as a limiting case. Alternatively, the central bank could update its projections
whenever new information cast doubt on the validity of the current projection. Once
market expectations and central bank projections diverge too far, the central bank
could adjust its projection (if the bank follows market expectations) or reestablish the
validity of the current projection (if market expectations were incorrect). In any case,
interest rate uncertainty should decline as the difference between market expectations
and the central bank projection (| f − p|) decreases.
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5 Counterfactual Analysis
The results presented in the previous section suggest that the central bank could lower
interest rate uncertainty by maintaining the freshness of projections. In this section, we
propose a counterfactual analysis in order to evaluate the volatility effects of alterna-
tive implementation schemes for central bank projections. To that end, we consider the
following implementation schemes:
(1) Projections with daily update: The central bank announces its interest rate pro-
jections on a daily basis. Accordingly, staleness of projections is not an issue and
market expectations should be in line with projections. In the counterfactual anal-
ysis, this scenario implies that ˜| f − p| ≡ 0 and τ̃t ≡ 0.
(2) Projections with state-dependent update: The central bank announces a new pro-
jection (or reinforces the current one) whenever | f − p| rises above a certain thresh-
old of S basis points. In this scenario, market expectations are constrained by a
band of 2 S basis points around the projection. In the counterfactual analysis, this
implementation scheme implies that ˜| f − p| ≤ S. Since the central bank is pay-
ing constant attention to the information content of the current projection, time-
varying effects on interest rate uncertainty should be negligible, i.e. τ̃t ≡ 0.
The counterfactual volatilities for the alternative schemes are derived from the
EGARCH models estimated for each maturity and sample period. The counterfactual
conditional volatility σ̃2t is obtained via a dynamic simulation of the estimated variance
equation:
log(σ̃2t ) = ω̂o + ω̂1
∣∣∣∣ ε̂t−1σ̂t−1
∣∣∣∣+ ω̂2 ε̂t−1σ̂t−1 + ω̂3log(σ̃2t−1) + ψ̂Dt
+ρ̂τ τ̃t + ρ̂
s ˜| f − p|t−1 + ρ̂s,τ ˜| f − p|t−1τ̃t (3)
The counterfactual values of | f − p| are defined as ˜| f − p| ≡ min{| f − p|, S}, where S
defines the threshold value that triggers an update of the projection. For the scenario
of daily updated projections, the threshold S equals 0. Typically, central banks change
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interest rates in steps of 25 or 50 basis points. Therefore, we use thresholds of 12.5 and
25 basis points for the state-dependent projection updates. Note that the size of the
threshold can be interpreted as the degree of the central bank’s aversion against stale
projections. Finally, since the implementation schemes under consideration rule out
pure time effects of projections, the original τt ∈ [0, 1] is replaced by τ̃t ≡ 0.
Table 5 summarizes the results from the counterfactual analysis. The first row shows
for each horizon the median of the conditional standard deviation of futures rates es-
timated for the current practice of quarterly projections. As expected, interest rate un-
certainty increases with the projection horizon j and is larger during the financial crisis
period. All remaining rows show counterfactual standard deviations resulting from
the hypothetical alternative implementation schemes introduced above.
Row 2 of Table 5 presents the counterfactual interest rate volatility for the limiting
case of daily projection updates. Since daily projections imply ˜| f − p|t−1 ≡ 0 and
τ̃t ≡ 0, the resulting counterfactual volatility is by construction always lower than
the estimated volatility implied by quarterly projections. Therefore, the counterfactual
standard deviations obtained for daily projections define a lower bound for interest
rate volatility. They give a benchmark for the potential improvement that can be ob-
tained by modifying the implementation scheme of projections. The second row im-
plies that this gain — reflected in the difference between average volatilities obtained
for projections with quarterly and daily updates — has remarkably increased both in
absolute and relative terms since the outbreak of the crisis. The reductions in average
standard deviations range from 0.17 to 0.58 basis points before and from 1.65 to 2.12
basis points during the crisis period. These are improvements of 5-22 % and 30-67 %
respectively.
Rows 3 and 4 of Table 5 show the average counterfactual standard deviations of the
state-dependent implementation schemes for central bank interest rate projections. In
these scenarios, the central bank updates its projection whenever the market perceives
the current projection as being too stale, i.e. whenever | f − p| exceeds the threshold S.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































or by confirming the current projection. Since the deviations of futures rates from the
corresponding projections are significantly larger, the volatility dampening effects of
thresholds can be expected to be more pronounced in the crisis period (cf. Table 1).
The counterfactual analysis confirms that interest rate volatility would have been
significantly lower if state-dependent projections had been used during the crisis pe-
riod. Even for a large threshold (S = 25), interest rate volatility decreases remarkably
implying volatility gains close to the first best scenario of daily projections. By contrast,
in the pre-crisis period, significant volatility-decreasing effects require the introduction
of a small threshold of 12.5 basis points, while the volatility-reducing gains of a large
threshold remain negligible. For both periods, the counterfactual exercise suggests that
the efficiency of the RBNZ’s interest rate projections could have been improved by a
state-dependent implementation scheme that ensures a certain degree of freshness of
projections.
6 Concluding Remarks
The efficiency of monetary policy crucially depends on the central bank’s expectations
management, see Blinder et al. (2008). Following the RBNZ’s lead, central banks in-
creasingly use interest rate projections to guide market expectations about the future
course of monetary policy. Typically, projections are announced and updated only once
a quarter. As a consequence of this rather inflexible implementation scheme, projec-
tions can become stale when new information enters the economy and their remaining
information content becomes dubious. Stale projections may even pose an obstacle to
central bank expectations management to the extent they confuse markets and, thereby,
increase interest rate uncertainty.
This paper uses data from New Zealand to investigate the time-varying and state-
dependent impact of probably stale interest rate projections on the expectations man-
agement of central banks. Our empirical results show that the impact of inflation sur-
prises and U.S. interest rates for rate expectations in New Zealand is the larger, the
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staler the projection, i.e. the more market expectations deviate from the rate projected
by the central bank. In line with Ehrmann and Sondermann (2012), our results confirm
a stabilizing effect of fresh central bank interest rate projections. In particular, interest
rate uncertainty is found to be larger if the current projection is outdated. However,
in addition to this pure time effect, this paper provides first evidence that the impact
of central bank projections on market expectations and interest rate uncertainty is also
state-dependent. We show that interest rate uncertainty significantly increases when
market expectations deviate from the actual interest rate projection.
The distorting effects of stale projections suggest that central bank expectations man-
agement could be implemented more efficiently. In order to assess the possible gains
for interest rate uncertainty, we conduct a counterfactual analysis applying alterna-
tive implementation schemes for central bank interest rate projections. Particularly,
we investigate the interest rate uncertainty implied by projections that are updated
whenever futures rates reveal that markets perceive the current projection as too stale.
In practice, this more flexible way to implement interest rate projections can be ac-
complished by adjusting the projection to market expectations (if market expectations
correctly anticipated the future change of projections) or by confirming the current
projection (if market expectations were incorrect).
Our results suggest that the publication of interest rate projections enhances central
bank communication as long as the central bank can ensure that the information con-
tent of projections remains sufficiently high. Yet, the experience of the RBNZ shows
that preventing quarterly projections from becoming stale is not an easy task. In an at-
tempt to ameliorate this problem, the Sveriges Riksbank publishes alternative scenar-
ios for the future interest rate path in its monetary policy report, see Svensson (2013).
The detailed discussion of various economic risks and their impact on the future in-
terest rate path should help markets to assess to what extent a certain interest rate
projection has become stale. Alternatively, the Bank of England and the FED recently
introduced outcome-based forward guidance in order to enhance the communication
of monetary policy, compare ECB (2014). In this case, future policy rates are condi-
20
tioned on explicit numerical thresholds on observed or projected unemployment or
inflation.
This paper suggests that central bank interest rate projections should be imple-
mented taking into account the market’s actual demand for forward guidance. Our
findings support the approach adopted by the ECB because its forward guidance is re-
newed or adjusted in response to market developments instead of providing inflexible
quarterly projections. By reassuring ’on demand’ that policy rates will be kept low for
an extended period of time, forward guidance is prevented from becoming stale.
21
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j = 5
Notes: Futures rates ft and central bank interest rate projections pt (dashed line) in percentage points at horizons j =
1, . . . , 5 as well as the absolute deviation | ft − pt| (at the bottom, left scale) from March 2000 until February 2013. The







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8 List of variables
f jt futures rate for the 90-day rate j quarters ahead, maturity-
adjusted [Source: Bloomberg L.P. / Code: ZBj Comdty]
[Futures rates are calculated by 100 minus the contract price
from 90-day Bank Bill Futures traded at the Sydney Futures Ex-
change.]
pjt central bank interest rate projection of the 90-day rate j
quarters ahead, maturity-adjusted [Source: RBNZ]
τt time measure for the age of the current interest rate projec-
tion
[0 ≤ τt ≤ 1 is the number of days since the last release divided
by the total number of days between the preceding and the sub-
sequent release of RBNZ’s interest rate projections: τt = 0 on
the announcement day; τt = 1 on the day before the subsequent
announcement]
∆rUSt change in the U.S. two-year government bond yield
[Bloomberg L.P. / USGG2YR Index]
∆et change in the New Zealand effective exchange rate
[Bloomberg L.P. / NZTW Index]
xCPIt CPI surprises for New Zealand [RBNZ, Statistics NZ]
xGDPt GDP surprises for New Zealand [RBNZ, Statistics NZ]
[CPI and GDP surprises are calculated as the difference between
the expectation [RBNZ Survey of Expectations] and the actual
value on the announcement days (once a quarter).]
DCPIt impulse dummy that equals one on CPI announcement
days
DGDPt impulse dummy that equals one on GDP announcement
days
DMPSt impulse dummy that equals one on projection publication
days
DOCRt impulse dummy that equals one on OCR announcement
days
rOCRt Official Cash Rate [RBNZ]





t−1) monetary policy surprise in current projection
DOCRt (r
OCR
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